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I. INTRODUCTION
The inductive reasoning test aptly titled, “The Duck Test,”
provides, “if it walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a
duck, it’s a duck.”1 Judge George Wu echoed this humorous sentiment
in Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller (“FilmOn Cal”) holding that
FilmOn, an Internet-based retransmission service, was a cable service
as defined by 17 U.S.C § 111(f)(3) of the Copyright Act of 1976
(Copyright Act).2 Judge Wu did not rely on the legislative history or
1 See, e.g., GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted) (determining whether “a participant in a judicial proceeding [that] has all the
qualities of a defendant . . . [is], in fact, [] a defendant.”); BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160
F.3d 1322, 1338 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1998) (The “duck test” has received wide support from
the courts.).
2 Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, 115 F. Supp 3d 1152, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
[hereinafter FilmOn Cal] (“[I]t is difficult to recognize the ambiguity the Second Circuit
saw in the statute, at least as applied to the facts of this case.”).
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agency opinions—unlike the Second Circuit3—nor did he wax
philosophical concerning whether the Internet is a tangible place—
unlike the District Court for the District of Columbia.4 Instead, Judge
Wu based his opinion on the plain language of the law and used
common sense to determine a facility in this context.
This comment focuses on the recent opinions of the Second
Circuit, Central District of California, and District of Columbia District
Court, in regards to Internet retransmission services (sometimes
referred to as “Internet TV”). The issue in all three cases was whether
an Internet retransmission system, which streams copyrighted
television programming live and over the Internet, could qualify as a
cable system for purposes of section 111 of the Copyright Act and,
therefore, be eligible to obtain a “compulsory license” to retransmit
broadcast signals.5 To put it concisely, the issue boils down to whether
an Internet retransmission service is a cable system. The Copyright Act
defines a cable system as follows:
[A] facility, located in any State . . . that in whole or in part
receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or
more television broadcast stations licensed by the FCC, and
makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs
by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications
channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for
such service.6
Parties that fall within this definition are eligible for a compulsory
license granted by section 111. A compulsory license is “[a] statutorily
created license that allows certain parties to use copyrighted material
without the explicit permission of the copyright owner in exchange for
a special royalty.”7 Therefore, a compulsory license granted by section
111 allows a cable system, without the express consent of any
copyright owner, to retransmit broadcast television programming to its
subscribers for a statutorily imposed fee and subject to several
regulations.8 This is a useful tool for cable companies because it
permits them to transmit copyrighted content without spending anytime
negotiating for licenses.

3

WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Ivi II].
Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Filmon X LLC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015)
[hereinafter FilmOn DC].
5 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279.
6 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2015).
7 Compulsory License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (10th ed. 2014).
8 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 278.
4
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A. Potential Effect of FilmOn Cal
The differences of opinion between FilmOn Cal, Ivi II, and
FilmOn DC, center around two Internet retransmission companies—
Ivi and FilmOn. During their trials, each company argued that its
particular system was a cable system for purposes of section 111(c).9
By applying Chevron deference,10 the Second Circuit held in Ivi
II that Ivi was not a cable system for two reasons.11 First, the legislative
history of section 111 suggests that an Internet retransmission company
is not a cable company because: (1) Congress never expressly amended
section 111 to apply to Internet retransmission services, and (2)
Congress enacted the provision to address the difficulties of providing
television reception by enabling the expansion of cable systems on a
localized, rather than nationwide, platform—a purpose that Ivi was not
seeking to address.12 Second, the court adopted the agency’s
interpretation of a cable system, which expressly excludes Internet
retransmission services, under step two of Chevron deference.13
In FilmOn Cal, Judge Wu declined to follow the Second Circuit
and ruled in favor of Internet retransmission services, determining it is
a cable system under section 111(c). Judge Wu held that FilmOn
should be considered a cable system so long as it can show that its
system meets other specific requirements, such as satisfying
localization requirements and complying with applicable Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulations.14 Although the case
is pending an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, FilmOn has claimed that its
new system—the Lanner System15—has improved localization
services and will placate the Copyright Office and broadcasters’
concerns.16
9 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279; FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1155–56; FilmOn DC, 150
F. Supp. 3d at 23.
10 A strong form of agency deference, courts will apply it when dealing with an
ambiguous statute that an agency has issued a formal rulemaking on. Chevron deference
instructs a court to first examine legislative history to determine a statute’s intent. If still
no affirmative intent can be gathered, courts are then to defer to an agency’s interpretation
of the statute, so long as it is reasonable. See infra Part II.C(i); Part III.A.
11 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 277.
12 Id. at 281–83.
13 Id. at 281–85.
14 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
15 Id. at 1156.
16 Id. at 1156–58; Margaret Harding McGill, FilmOn CEO Prods FCC to Bring Local
Broadcast TV Online, LAW360 (Oct. 9, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles
/713112/filmon-ceo-prods-fcc-to-bring-local-broadcast-tv-online (FilmOn has expressed
its willingness to abide by any applicable FCC regulations and has recently spoken to the
FCC about the issue).
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Analyzing the very same definition that Ivi II and FilmOn Cal
addressed, the court in FilmOn DC agreed with Ivi II’s outcome, but
for different reasons. The DC District Court believed FilmOn is not a
cable system because it uses the Internet, a pathway that it does not
control, to retransmit content to subscribers.17 Additionally, the DC
District Court applied Skidmore deference, a lesser form of deference
than Chevron.18 The court found the Copyright Office’s interpretation
persuasive, and for this reason denied FilmOn a compulsory license.19
B. Solution Summary
This comment argues that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
should affirm the FilmOn Cal decision and create a circuit split because
the district court properly defined a cable system under the Copyright
Act and FilmOn’s system fits within said definition.
Part II of this comment will do the following: (1) summarize the
history of cable systems and the compulsory license; (2) analyze the
legislative intent behind the license; (3) provide an in-depth analysis of
Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, FilmOn DC, and other related cases; and (4) discuss
the philosophy that presently underlies the compulsory license. Part III
will explain why the Ninth Circuit should affirm the FilmOn Cal
decision and break with the Second Circuit and DC District Court.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History: From Satellites on Hilltops to TV on Your Lap
i. The Traditional Cable Systems
The compulsory license emerged in response to two Supreme
Court decisions from 1968 and 1974 that allowed cable systems to
retransmit copyrighted work to the masses without having to pay
anything to rights holders.20 The Court held in Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc. that the first cable systems’
retransmissions did not constitute copyright infringement because the
companies were not performing. The Court reasoned the cable system
17

FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 19.
A lesser form of agency deference than Chevron deference, courts will “look to the
degree of [an] agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency’s position,” when reviewing. FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d
1, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2015).
19 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 27–29.
20 These decisions referred to cable systems as Community Antenna Television
(CATV) systems. Courts and academics now refer to CATV systems as cable systems.
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014) [hereinafter Aereo III].
18
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functioned more like a viewer than a broadcaster.21 As cable systems
evolved, the Supreme Court determined in Teleprompter v. Columbia
Broad. Sys. that cable systems new features (e.g., their own
broadcasting channels and selling commercial space) were still noninfringing and allowed cable systems “to compete more effectively
with broadcasters for the television market.”22 Fortnightly and
Teleprompter essentially authorized cable systems “to retransmit
broadcast television programming without incurring any costs to the
copyright owners.”23
ii. The Copyright Act of 1976
Congress amended the Copyright Act in order to better respect the
rights of copyright holders and ensure they received fair compensation
for their works.24 Congress enacted section 111(c) compulsory license,
requiring cable systems to pay copyright owners to retransmit the
owners’ content.25
Through this statute, Congress overturned
Fortnightly and Teleprompter, declaring cable systems’
retransmissions to be performances and requiring cable systems pay a
fee to retransmit such performances to the public.26 The compulsory
license balances two ideals: (1) the societal benefit cable systems
provide (i.e., expansive access to television programming), and (2) the
significance of respecting one’s property rights.27 Further, Congress
passed the statute to combat the undue burden of requiring cable
systems to negotiate with each and every copyright owner to retransmit
broadcast signals.28
The license is conditioned on reporting
requirements, payment of royalties, a ban on the substitution or deletion
of commercials, and geographical limitations on the license for
programs broadcasted by Canadian or Mexican stations.29
iii. Satellites
Not long after the amendments to the Copyright Act, satellite
companies entered the retransmission market, requesting compulsory
21
22
23

I].

24

Id.
Id.
WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Ivi

Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506.
Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 2012).
26 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2505.
27 See Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME
VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT 1, 3 (2008).
28 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5569, 5704 (1976).
29 Id. at 5704.
25

2016]

Internet TV

113

licenses. In Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit held that satellite carriers qualified as cable systems
under section 111 and were entitled to compulsory licenses.30 The
United States Copyright Office (the “Copyright Office” or the
“Office”) had an issue with this decision because the localized intent
of the compulsory license was not meant to apply to national
retransmission services and the FCC does not regulate satellites.31
In response, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer Act,
which denied satellite carriers a section 111(c) compulsory license, but
provided them with a separate statutory license.32 In 1998 Congress
enacted 17 U.S.C. § 122, authorizing satellite carriers—once criticized
for supporting a nationwide service—to retransmit local broadcast
programming back into a local market.33 Congress has actively
legislated in this area, amending section 122 five times since 2002.34
iv. Internet Retransmission Services: The Aereo Decision
The most recent development within this area of law is Aereo III,
where the Supreme Court determined that an Internet-based
retransmission service publicly performs through its retransmissions of
copyright owners’ content.35 This is significant because it requires
Internet retransmission services to obtain a license from copyright
holders in order to retransmit content.
Aereo—which is now defunct—provided retransmissions of TV
broadcasts through thousands of small antennas, each of which were
attributed to a single, active Aereo subscriber at any time (i.e., no two
Aereo subscribers would be assigned the same antenna at once).36 The
subscriber first selected a channel for Aereo’s services to translate into
data that could be used over the Internet.37 The data was saved to one
of Aereo’s servers and retransmitted to that individual’s computer for
streaming.38 If two subscribers clicked to view the same programming
at the same time, they would each receive an individual copy made for
him or her, but of the same material.39
30

1991).
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir.
57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17).
See 17 U.S.C. § 119(2015); 56 Fed. Reg. 31, 580 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 3283 (1992).
FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2015).
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
Id. at 2503.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Aereo’s main argument paralleled the arguments made by the
cable systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.40 Aereo argued that it
does not publicly perform the copyright, but rather provides equipment;
any performance that may occur happens at the hands of the
subscriber.41 If the Court agreed that Aereo’s retransmissions did not
constitute a public performance, then Aereo would not be infringing
the copyrights of the content it displayed. Additionally, Aereo argued
that it only created and retransmitted personal copies of the content to
its subscribers because there was only one active subscriber for any one
antenna.42 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling: (1) Aereo was not
just an equipment provider because its systems perform copyrighted
material, and (2) Aereo performs when it publicly displays “the same
contemporaneous[] [programming to multiple people],” despite its
“personal copies” assertion.43 Therefore, Internet retransmission
services, like Aereo, publicly perform when they retransmit
copyrighted works. Absent a license from the proper rights holders,
such retransmissions infringe on the copyright holders’ rights.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted Aereo’s system bore an
“overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976
amendments” and stated an Internet-based service’s overall
commercial objective is no different than a cable companies.44 Further,
at oral argument, Justice Sonia Sotomayer stated, “I look at the
definition of a cable company, and [Aereo] seems to fit.”45
Using these comments, Aereo raised a new argument on remand
in the Southern District of New York (SDNY): the comparisons laid
out in the opinion and Justice Sotomayer’s statements held, or at the
very least inferred, Aereo was a cable system.46 In a short opinion, the
court dismissed the notion that such statements or comments could
have any legal effect and that the analogies made between cable
systems and the CATV systems were only for the purposes of finding
Aereo to publicly perform.47 The court stated that simply because

40

Id. at 2511.
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
42 Id. at 2508–09.
43 Id. at 2506, 2510.
44 Id. at 2508.
45 Joe Mullin, Analysis: New motions show gaping holes in Supreme Court’s Aereo
ruling, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 4, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2014/08/aereo-tells-court-its-bleeding-to-death-but-gets-no-relief/.
46 ABC v. Aereo, Inc., 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Aereo IV] (several other failed defenses were raised).
47 Id. at *19–20 (“ . . . only the Justices’ written opinions have the force of law.”).
41
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Aereo was found to perform publicly does not render it a cable
system.48
B. Congress and the Copyright Office on the Compulsory License
i. Legislative Intent
Congress created section 111 to balance the societal benefits a
cable system provides to the viewing public, with a copyright holders
interest in their work.49 Further, Congress was aware of the
impracticality of requiring a potential cable system to negotiate with
every individual copyright owner whose work it wished to retransmit.50
In order to address these competing interests, Congress created a
statutorily defined royalty.51
ii. The Copyright Office’s Interpretation
The Copyright Office does not believe Internet retransmission
services should qualify for a compulsory license.52 It considers some
differences, such as the nature of delivery, to be fundamental and urge
the withholding of a license.53 Its principal concern, however, is
whether Internet retransmissions can be controlled geographically.54
The localization requirement serves several ends, such as allowing
broadcasters to sell advertising space based on region and appropriately
deliver content to viewers in different time zones.55 Despite this view,
Verizon and AT&T have obtained compulsory licenses for their
respective TV services despite their utilization of Internet Protocol.56
The Copyright Office first examined the issue presented by
Internet retransmission services in 1999, determining that it was too
early to grant the services a compulsory license. In subsequent years,
the Copyright Office has made clear its position that Internet

48

Id. at *18.
Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 2012).
50 See supra Part II.A (The Copyright Act of 1976).
51 Id.
52 Letter from J. Charlesworth, Copyright Office General Counsel (July 23, 2014).
53 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000).
54 Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to the Honorable Howard
Coble (Nov. 10, 1999) (“Our principal concern is the extent to which Internet
retransmissions of broadcast signals can be controlled geographically.”).
55 Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2012).
56 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Ivi I, 765 F. Supp.
2d 594, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
49
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retransmission services should not receive compulsory licenses.57 Yet,
when discussing “new distribution technologies” in a recent report, the
Copyright Office included the following statement:
To be clear, the Office is not against new distribution models
that use Internet protocol to deliver programming, but only
opposes the circumstance where any online content
aggregator would have the ability to use a statutory license
to sidestep private agreements and free from any of the
limitations imposed on cable operators and satellite carriers
by the Communications Act and the FCC’s rules.58
Additionally, the Office has acknowledged that the issues
presented by such an innovation are entangled with communications
law and policy issues, the analysis of which is outside its expertise.59
iii. Current Ideology of the Compulsory License
Internet retransmission services are not alone from being
scrutinized by the Copyright Office; the Office actually has a
longstanding opposition to the compulsory license itself.60 The
Copyright Office believes the compulsory license allows cable systems
to carry local signals for a de minimis fee and that a governmentadministered license “prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair
value of copyrighted works.”61 They see negotiation between the
representatives from the industries involved and users as a better
solution.62
C. Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC
This section will discuss the systems and business model of the
respective Internet retransmission systems of Ivi and FilmOn and will
further unpack each court’s analysis of the issue. Finally, it will situate
the discussion within the greater, national context by examining one
other case from the SDNY where the same issue arose.

57 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000).
58 U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT 188 (2008).
59 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON MARKETPLACE ALTERNATIVES TO REPLACE
STATUTORY LICENSES (Aug. 29, 2011).
60 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000).
61 Id.
62 Id.
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i. Ivi II
Ivi’s system worked like most cable systems by capturing and
retransmitting broadcast signals from stations located across the
country, but it differed in two significant ways:
(1) Rather than being restricted to one’s local market
broadcasting, any Ivi subscriber was able to view, without altering his
or her computer settings, live streams from any local station in New
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, or Seattle;63 and
(2) Ivi’s service did not comply with the applicable rules,
regulations, or authorizations of the FCC.64
After transmitting the signal to its subscribers, Ivi rendered the
content unusable and prevented it from being viewed, captured, or
passed along by its consumers.65
To determine the statute’s intent, Ivi II applied Chevron
deference.66 Chevron deference is generally warranted when an
agency’s interpretation of the statute is available, almost always
through formal notice.67 Chevron first requires the court to “consider
whether Congress has clearly spoken on the issue.”68 If such intent is
clear, no more analysis need be done, but if it appears ambiguous, the
court must turn to the legislative history to determine the statute’s
intent.69 If still no affirmative intent can be gathered, step two instructs
the court to “defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long
as it is reasonable.”70
Applying step one, the court found Congress’s intent unclear.71
Specifically, the court could not conclude whether Ivi’s “service (1) is
or utilizes a ‘facility’ (2) that receives and retransmits signals (3)
through [a prescribed communication channel].”72 Ivi attempted to fit
within the definition of a cable system.
Following Chevron deference, the court looked to section 111’s
legislative history and determined it was intended to address the issues
of reception and remote access to broadcasting that supports localized,
63

Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 599.
65 Id. at 598.
66 Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 2012).
67 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001)).
68 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279 (citing Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116
(2d Cir. 2007)).
69 See id.
70 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
71 See id. at 280.
72 Id. (emphasis added).
64
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not nationwide, systems.73 This analysis proscribed the compulsory
license from applying to Ivi’s system because Ivi provided a
nationwide service.74 To remove any doubt about the validity of its
interpretation of the statute, the court moved on to step two of the
Chevron analysis and applied the Copyright Office’s interpretation of
section 111 as it pertains to Internet retransmission services.75 The
court sided with the Copyright Office’s interpretation, finding it
“reasonable and persuasive.”76
ii. FilmOn Cal
FilmOn’s retransmission system, referred to as the Lanner system,
features “a single master antenna on the roof of a commercial data
center, which routes signals to an antenna box where the signals are
amplified and captured by small antennas.”77 By selecting a program
to view from a list on FilmOn’s website, a user’s computer has
transmitted a signal from FilmOn’s servers via the Internet.78 As a way
of managing a subscriber’s access to his or her respective local
channels, FilmOn processes its subscribers’ requests from a local
facility within a subscriber’s region.79 In anticipation of this trial,
FilmOn also enhanced its localization services by requiring a user’s
credit card address, and a viewing device located in the market area of
which programming it was receiving.80 FilmOn’s system also employs
a security measure in the form of an “encryption token” that ensures
the user with the authorized IP address is the only one able to access
the broadcast stream.81
FilmOn, unlike Ivi, focused its arguments and efforts leading up
to litigation on closing the alleged gap between a more traditional cable
system and its system by implementing the following:
(1) FilmOn restarted its operations as a Multichannel Video
Programming Distributor to better fit within the FCC regulations;82
73

See supra Part II.A (The Copyright Act of 1976).
Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284.
75 Id. at 283.
76 Id. at 284. See supra Part II.B (ii).
77 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id at 1156–57.
81 Id. at 1157.
82 Id. at 1159 (“a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) is any person
such as . . . a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct
broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who
makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video
programming”).
74
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(2) FilmOn announced—and continues to express—its
willingness and ability to comply with all applicable regulations,
including FCC ones;83 and
(3) FilmOn’s system employs several localization safeguards to
ensure subscribers are viewing only their local markets.84
Proving its eagerness to operate accordingly, FilmOn mailed over
one hundred letters to broadcasters requesting knowledge of whether
the broadcasters would elect “must-carry” status as required by FCC
regulations.85 Additionally, per the Copyright Office’s compulsory
license requirements, FilmOn submitted to them its statements of
accounting and paid corresponding fees. 86
Breaking from Ivi II, the court in FilmOn Cal did not inquire into
the legislative history or move onto the second step of Chevron because
it did not have the same questions as Ivi II—the court concluded
Congress’s definition of a cable system to be clear.87 Namely, Judge
Wu did not probe whether the Internet is a facility; instead finding
FilmOn’s buildings that are located wholly in particular states, hosting
FilmOn’s retransmitting antennas, as the facilities.88 Before any
content is retransmitted, these physical facilities receive the
broadcasters’ signals.89 From there, the content is retransmitted via
“wires, cables, microwave, or other communication channels to the
corresponding subscribers.”90 Therefore, per the Copyright Act’s
definition of a cable system, FilmOn maintains and controls the
facilities that are used for the retransmissions and the operation that in
fact precedes the Internet in FilmOn’s scheme. 91 Additionally, the
court held the terms “headends” and “contiguous communities” do not
have any bearing on the definition of a cable system. 92 Instead, the
court stated these terms “merely provide[] that certain commonly

83

FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1170.
Id. at 1156–58.
85 Id. at 1159.
86 Id. (During this period, FilmOn failed to pay royalties to the opposing parties
involved in this matter).
87 See id. at 1167 (“[I]t is difficult to recognize the ambiguity the Second Circuit saw
in the statute, at least as applied to the facts of this case.”).
88 Id. (adding that the Copyright Office employed a “strange reading of the words
‘facility’ and ‘communications’ channel,” and that Ivi II’s reading of § 111 was “overly
narrow”).
89 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1167.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1167–68 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 1168.
84
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owned cable systems will be treated as a single system for purposes of
computing a royalty.”93
Therefore, due to the unambiguous, express language of
Congress, the court stopped at the first step of Chevron deference,
deciding that FilmOn was a cable system and thus entitled to a
compulsory license granted under section 111.94 No legislative history
analysis or agency deference would be necessary as stipulated through
Chevron deference.95 The court added that despite the Copyright
Office’s refusal to grant compulsory licenses to Internet retransmission
services, the Office does not have the last say on the matter. 96 Instead
courts have the option to merely treat the Office’s opinion as persuasive
in this context.97 The Copyright Office acknowledged it does not have
the last say when it accepted FilmOn’s payment of statutory fees for
purposes of section 111, on a provisional basis.98
iii. FilmOn DC
FilmOn DC, a concurrent case involving the same parties and
issue as FilmOn Cal, reached a different result. While the verdict had
the same overall outcome as Ivi II, the DC court’s analysis was
different.99 The court first held that FilmOn’s reliance on the Internet
rendered it incapable of being a cable system under section 111(f)(3)
because its physical facilities first retransmit the signals to Internet
service providers, as opposed to the subscribers directly.100 Despite the
fact that FilmOn’s system uses “cables, wires, and microwaves,” it
involves a process that utilizes “a global network of interconnected
computers.”101 The court interpreted section 111(f)(3) to read, “any
system that fails to encompass the distribution medium and does not
retransmit the signals directly to the subscriber does not qualify as a
cable system.”102 Since FilmOn does not control the entirety of its
retransmissions path to subscribers, it is not a cable system.103
Specifically, the court found Internet retransmission systems to differ
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Id.
Id. at 1171.
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1166.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
See FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2015).
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
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from the cable systems in 1976 that “controlled the entire transmission
path leading directly to the subscribers.”104
The court also denied that the language, “or other communications
channels” in section 111(c) expressed Congress’s intent for the
compulsory license to encompass evolving technologies.105 The court
concluded that the Internet is not similar or of the same kind as “wires,
cables, or microwaves” because it “operates through nebulous
international connections in cyberspace thus not constituting a
‘channel’ similar to ‘wires, cables or microwave.’”106
Additionally, the court broke from Ivi II by refusing to apply
Chevron deference due to the absence of any formal rulemaking by the
Copyright Office.107 Instead, the DC Court applied Skidmore
deference.108 When determining whether to apply Skidmore deference,
courts must “look to the degree of [an] agency’s care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency’s position.”109 The court found that the Copyright Office has
consistently interpreted section 111(f)(3) to deny that Internet
retransmission services are cable systems because they are not “an
inherently localized transmission media of limited availability.”110 The
court found this interpretation “persuasive because it is grounded in the
statute’s text and legislative history,” and, therefore, allowed Skidmore
deference to be applied.111 Due to the Internet’s worldwide
capabilities, the court held that FilmOn’s system is not inherently
localized and is inconsistent with the Copyright Office’s
interpretation.112
Applying the definition of a cable system to FilmOn’s, the court
disagreed that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Aereo III rendered the
statute and the transmit clause “technologically-agnostic”—meaning
the statute did not refer to types of technology, but only to the broad
104 Id. at 20–21 (“The Internet also relies on multiple other types of distribution media,
such as satellite, cellular networks, and wifi”).
105 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 21–22.
106 Id. at 22–23 (“when a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general
term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it
follows”); The court also refused a broad interpretation of “other communication channels”
because it may violate “international obligation[s].”).
107 Id. at 25 (“[T]he Court will not apply Chevron deference in the absence of formal
rulemaking here because the Copyright Office issued regulations after notice-andcomment in other situations, such as those concerning satellite carriers.”).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 27.
111 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 27.
112 Id. at 28.
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process of retransmitting signals. 113 The court simply stated that
although an Internet retransmission service may be similar to cable
systems in the way it performs, this does not mean it is similar to cable
systems for all purposes, namely the way it retransmits
programming.114 Nevertheless, in a footnote, the court acknowledged
that it too had analogized FilmOn to cable television companies,
emphasizing the similarities in regards to its “relationship[s] with
broadcasters such as [the] Plaintiffs.”115
D. Additional Case Law
Following Aereo III, FilmOn relied on the comparisons made by
the Supreme Court between the traditional cable systems in Fortnightly
and Teleprompter and Internet retransmission systems, arguing that in
light of such comparisons, FilmOn qualifies as a cable system.116 The
court disagreed, holding FilmOn placed “too much importance” on the
Supreme Court’s cable system analogies, and that such analogies were
“not the same as a judicial finding” that Aereo is a cable system.117
Further, the court relied on its precedent from Ivi II.118
E. Current State of the Law
i. No Movement from Congress
Unlike with satellite carriers, Congress has yet to codify a
statutory provision for Internet-based retransmission services, despite
several courts litigating the issue.119 In addition, despite the welldocumented history of displeasure from the Copyright Office,120 the
compulsory license remains an integral part in providing broadcasting
to the public and continues to be relied upon for business arrangements.
This leaves Internet TV with nowhere to turn but the courts in its fight
to provide the public with a new, yet familiar way to consume
broadcasting.
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Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
115 Id. at 16–17 n.15.
116 CBS Broad., Inc. v. FilmOn.com, 10 Civ. 7532, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101894, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) [hereinafter FilmOn SDNY].
117 Id. at *11.
118 Id. at *12.
119 Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
120 See supra Part II.B(iii).
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ii. FCC Taking Sides?
The FCC is in the process of creating a proposal to determine
whether Internet-based services qualify as “multichannel video
programming distributors” (“MVPD”) under communications law.121
The proposal would widen the FCC’s interpretation of MVPD to
include any technology that provides a linear stream or programming
(i.e., services that provide scheduled TV programming without DVR
systems).122 Therefore, the outcome of this proposal may very well
decree Internet retransmission services compatible with FCC
regulations. Judge Wu acknowledged this in FilmOn Cal, but stated
the notice would not affect his decision.123
III. ANALYSIS
This section will set out the arguments for why the Ninth Circuit
should affirm its district court’s decision holding FilmOn’s Internet
retransmission service to be a cable system for purposes of section 111
of the Copyright Act. First, the application of Chevron deference in Ivi
II is misapplied. It is not at all obvious that that style of deference was
warranted as Ivi II’s missing analysis would have one believe.
Additionally, if any agency deference were to be applied, the Copyright
Office’s reasoning would not apply to FilmOn’s compatible
technology.124 Second, Judge Wu provided a straightforward, fair
reading of section 111(f)(3) and correctly determined that FilmOn’s
Internet-based service fits well within the definition.125 Finally, the
Ninth Circuit should take notice of the several analogies made between
Internet retransmission systems and cable systems throughout the
several Internet TV opinions; while it may not definitively show that
the systems are cable systems, it provides further evidence of their
striking similarities.126

121 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of Promotional Innovation and
Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services,
MB Docket No. 14-261, FCC 14-210 (Dec. 19, 2014).
122 Id.
123 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
124 See infra Part III.A.
125 See infra Part III.B(i).
126 See infra Part III.B(ii).
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A. Agency Deference
i. The Second Circuit’s Misapplication of Chevron Deference
By applying Chevron deference, Ivi II held that Ivi was not a cable
system by considering the legislative history of the compulsory license
and definition of a cable system.127 To begin this analysis, the Second
Circuit stated, “the Copyright Office . . . has spoken on the issue of
whether section 111’s compulsory licenses extend to Internet
retransmissions. Accordingly, we utilize [Chevron deference].”128
This bare assertion, however, is not a correct analysis of the law
because Chevron deference is not simply warranted merely by an
agency’s interpretation through administrative statements.129 The
scope of when Chevron deference may be applied has been limited by
recent decisions.130 Generally, interpretations that lack the force of law
do not warrant Chevron deference (e.g., opinion letters, policy
statements, agency manuals).131 Even though the absence of a final
regulation is not necessarily determinative, “the overwhelming number
of cases [that have applied] Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits
of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”132
The Copyright Office, although consistently stating that Internet
retransmission services should not be entitled to compulsory licensing,
has never issued regulations formally on the matter.133 The Office’s
position comes from a collection of statements, policy documents, and
congressional testimonies.134 FilmOn DC refused to follow Ivi II due
to the Second Circuit’s failure to explain why Chevron deference was
warranted.135 While the absence of a final regulation may not be
determinative, “the Copyright Office [has] issued [formal]
regulations . . . in other [similar] situations, such as those concerning
satellite carriers,” but clearly refused here despite its continuing
statements on the matter.136
Ivi II was an administrative law decision as much as it was a
copyright law decision. Given the Copyright Office’s longstanding
127

Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 289 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
129 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2015).
130 Id.
131 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
132 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 219 (2001) (quotation marks omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See id.
136 Id.
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opposition to Internet retransmission systems, and the compulsory
license in general, it is not surprising the Second Circuit ruled against
Internet retransmission systems. Chevron deference should not have
been applied in Ivi II, however, because of the lack of formal
rulemaking from the Copyright Office.
ii. Eliminating the Copyright Office’s Concerns
Although Ivi II and FilmOn DC did not apply the same degree of
deference, the two courts still utilized the same set of facts and opinions
expressed by the Copyright Office. The Office’s stance on the issue
expressly rejects the idea that a service such as FilmOn could constitute
a cable system.137 Utilizing Chevron deference, Ivi II adopted this
interpretation, while FilmOn DC employing Skidmore deference,
acknowledged the Office’s views were persuasive.138
The Copyright Office’s interpretation of section 111 supports the
notion that to qualify for a compulsory license a cable system must
retransmit localized content.139 While there should be no doubt to this,
this was a major concern in Ivi II because Ivi’s service was not at all
localized, allowing for a subscriber in New York to stream a Seattle
broadcast.140 FilmOn, however, is the catalyst in this equation because,
unlike Ivi, FilmOn fully supports localization and plans to prove that
its system is capable of retransmitting localized broadcasts to the
appropriate subscribers within its specific region.141 As noted by
FilmOn Cal and FilmOn DC, FilmOn has implemented several
measures to ensure its retransmissions are properly localized.142
Therefore, the Copyright Office’s geographical concern with Internet
retransmission services in general, as cited by the Ivi II and FilmOn DC
decisions, will not apply to FilmOn so long as the company can show
on appeal its service’s proficient localization measures.143
Another attribute of section 111 is that its “operation . . . hinge[s]
on the FCC rules regulating the cable industry.”144 Similar to the above
analysis, FilmOn is not arguing that its will not or cannot comply with
FCC regulations, as Ivi did.145 Instead, FilmOn understands the
importance of compliance and has expressed its willingness and
137
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139
140
141
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See supra Part II.B(ii).
FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 27–28.
See supra Part II.B(ii).
Id.
See supra Part II.C(i).
See supra Part II.C(iii).
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1169.
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capability to observe all appropriate FCC regulations.146 Additionally,
the Copyright Office has endorsed compulsory licenses to AT&T and
Verizon for their TV services, despite the systems’ usage of Internet
Protocol.147 Verizon even brashly advertises across the nation that its
system is “not cable.”148
Finally, the FCC is in the process of creating a proposal that would
allow Internet retransmission services to fall within its regulation.149
Despite opposition from many of the same plaintiffs in the FilmOn and
Ivi cases, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler has recently advocated to
expand the definition of a cable system from the traditional definition
utilized by the FCC, to allow for a more competitive market.150
B. If It Walks Like a Duck . . .
The Ninth Circuit should affirm the district court’s decision,
holding FilmOn to be a cable system under the Copyright Act because
FilmOn operates physical facilities that receive broadcaster signals and
retransmit those signals; this is to say that the Internet is not the
receiving “facility,” per section 111(f)(3). Additionally, providing
some clarity to a controversial question, FilmOn and its competitors
mirror cable systems in seemingly every way.151
i. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”152
Applying the definition of a cable system, Ivi II and FilmOn DC
both stopped at the same inquiry: Is the Internet a facility?153 Ivi II left
its inquiry at “unclear,” but acknowledged that the Internet is not a
“tangible entity” that is required of a physical facility.154 FilmOn DC
stated the Internet could not be a facility as defined by section
111(f)(3).155
146

Id.
Id. at 1170 (citing Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 614).
148 Fios by Verizon, Fios is Not Cable. We’re Wired Differently, YOUTUBE (June 14,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLO8JqVrI_E.
149 See supra Part II.E.
150 Id.
151 See supra Part III.A(2).
152 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
153 See Ivi II, 691 F.3d 275, 280 (2d Cir. 2012); see also FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d
1, 19 (D.D.C. 2015).
154 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 280 (“[The Internet] is neither a physical nor a tangible entity;
rather, it is ‘a global network of millions of interconnected computers.’” (Citations
omitted)).
155 FilmOn DC, 150 F. Supp. 3d at 19.
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The definition of a cable system on its face requires: (1) there to
be a facility that “receives” the broadcasters’ signals; (2) that that
facility be located in a state or territory; and (3) that the facility
retransmit the signals via “wires, cables, microwaves, or other
communication channels to subscribing members of the public.”156
The definition does not limit cable systems to those that “encompass
the distribution medium,” nor does it require a system’s
retransmissions be “direct[].”157
FilmOn Cal—rather than “focus[ing] on the mysterious ‘ether’”
(a.k.a. the Internet)—simply found that FilmOn’s “antennas, located in
particular buildings wholly within particular states,” are the receiving
facilities in accordance with section 111(f)(3). 158 These facilities then
retransmit the signals through familiar means, such as “wires, cables,
microwave, or other communication channels.”159 Therefore, the
Internet is not the facility here.160 As FilmOn Cal observed, all of the
electrical instrumentalities—which FilmOn has control over and
operates—precede the Internet in its operation.161 Therefore, applying
section 111’s definition of a cable system to the facts, FilmOn’s
operational facilities that receive the signals, are physically located in
several states, and retransmit the signals through a prescribed
communication channel to a localized geographical region.
Additionally, despite what FilmOn DC held, section 111(f)(3) makes
no mention of a requirement for signals to be directly retransmitted to
subscribers.162 Furthermore, even if legislative history purports
otherwise, history was broken when AT&T Uverse and Verizon Fios
were granted a section 111(c) compulsory license because they use the
Internet.
Next Ivi II and FilmOn DC, agreeing with the Copyright Office,
stated that the terms “headends” and “contiguous communities,” found
in the second sentence of the cable system definition, evinced a
localized service and not a nationwide one.163 But, this should not
affect the Ninth Circuit’s determination. First, because as Judge Wu
held, the second sentence of the definition of cable system is intended
to distinguish “larger [cable] system[s] for purposes of the royalty
156
157
158
159
160
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determination,” instead of modifying the definition of cable systems.
Second, even if we were to accept the Second Circuit and DC Court’s
reading, FilmOn’s service still fits within it, so long as localization
safeguards exist. 164
To the first point, larger cable systems are treated as a single one
to ensure they may contribute larger per-subscriber royalty payments—
this is the extent of this sentence’s purpose.165 To the latter point,
FilmOn has recently implemented a litany of localization measures and
Judge Wu granted it the opportunity to display such safeguards on
appeal.166 So long as it does so, FilmOn will have removed its service
from the likes of national ones (e.g., satellites, Aereo, and Ivi) and
rendered itself compatible with the localized intent of section 111.
ii. Likened to Cable Systems
Throughout Aereo III, the Supreme Court made undeniable
comparisons between Aereo’s system and the traditional cable
systems.167 First, after analyzing the history of the Copyright Act and
compulsory license, the Court noted Aereo’s activities were
“substantially similar” to traditional cable systems.168 Immediately
following this sentence, the Supreme Court cited a House Report,
which stated a cable system’s main operation is “based on the carriage
of copyrighted program material.”169 Second, the Supreme Court noted
that any technological differences between Aereo’s system and cable
systems—not just traditional cable systems—did not distinguish
Aereo’s system in general, its commercial objective, nor its
subscribers’ viewing experience.170
FilmOn SDNY and Aereo IV dismissed the argument that such
remarks by the Supreme Court established Internet retransmission
services as cable systems.171 The courts were correct that this was not
the holding in Aereo III, however, to simply dismiss the Supreme
164

FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1167–68.
Id.
166 Id. at 1171.
167 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“[A]n entity that acts like a CATV system
itself performs.”); (“Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV
companies that Congress amended the Act to reach.”); Id. at 2510 (“For one thing, the
history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to the enactment of the Transmit Clause
informs our conclusion that Aereo ‘perform[s].’”).
168 Id. at 2506.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 2508.
171 FilmOn SDNY, 10 Civ. 7532, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101894, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July
24, 2014); Aereo IV, 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *19–20 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 23, 2014).
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Court’s unambiguous analogies would be another kind of fallacy. The
courts limited the quotes to only bear on the issue of public
performance for purposes of the Transmit Clause, but their words and
placement may suggest more. Firstly, the court in Aereo IV
mischaracterized the analogies as only pertaining to traditional cable
systems.
The Supreme Court clearly provided that Internet
retransmission systems are similar to cable systems in general, have the
same overall commercial objective, and provide the seam viewing
experience through its retransmissions.172 Secondly, when examining
the Transmit Clause, the Supreme Court made clear that the general
operation of a cable system is no different than Internet retransmission
systems.173 This is to say that Aereo, and by comparison other Internet
TV systems, communicate retransmissions to subscribers analogous to
those cable systems already entitled to compulsory licensing.
Moreover, the antagonistic broadcast companies even argued in
Aereo II “that Aereo’s [re]transmissions of broadcast television
programs . . . are analogous to the retransmissions of network
programming made by cable systems.”174 The broadcasters would go
on to declare Aereo’s system was “functionally equivalent to a cable
television provider.”175
Given the analogies made by the Supreme Court and the broadcast
companies, once FilmOn can display its improved localization
safeguards and compliance with applicable regulations, what more is
necessary to show it is a cable system? Indeed “an implication is not a
holding,”176 but it is a significant connection that the Ninth Circuit
should take notice of in its impending decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC decisions provide insight
as to how one statute can be interpreted several different ways. The
decision can become more confusing when legislative history from 40
years ago and an agency’s opinion enter the fray. FilmOn Cal
establishes the best, clear-cut interpretation of section 111. By reading
the statute for what it is and correctly refraining from the Copyright
172 Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506, 2508 (“[The technological differences] do not render
Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of cable companies. Nor do they
significantly alter the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers.”).
173 Id. at 2510.
174 WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d Cir. 2013).
175 Id. at 693.
176 FilmOn SDNY, 10 Civ. 7532, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101894, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July
24, 2014).

130

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 13:107

Office’s discouraging opinion, Judge Wu was able to correctly
determine that FilmOn’s system is a cable system within the definition
and would be entitled to a compulsory license following a display of
its improved measures.

